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PACIFIC SOU'rHWES'r DEYELOP:rviEN'!.' CORPORA'l'ION
,
v WESTERN P ACLB'IC HAU_,RQAD COMPANY
), Re[1] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real PropertyInterests Affected.-The term "real estate"
used in the

*

[2J

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

statute of frauds
Code,
subd. 5, Code Civ. Proc.,
~ 1973, subd. 5) conforms with the eommon-law detlnition of
real property as induding only a freehold interest in land,
mul excludes estates for years or lesser duration.
Brokers-Employment--Written Authorization.--In determining the nature of services which will
employment
eontract within the statute of
the
"to sell or
purchase" includes "to aid or assist in the
or sale"
of real estate; sueh broad construetion of the term conforms
with a primary purpose of the statute, the
of real
estate owners from assertion of false claims
agents.
!d.-Employment--Written Authorization.--The procurement
of an option agreement for the purchase of real property is a
contract that aid~ or a~sist in the
or sale of real
property, and properly emnes within the statute of frauds.
!d.-Employment--Written Authorization.~--A contract em~
ploying a broker to obtain au option for the
of real
property tomes within the statute of fraud.~ and must be in
writing.
!d.-Employment-Written Authorization.--The chief element
required to he shown in writing with respect to a broker's
authority to buy or sell realty is the fact of his employment
to act for the principal in the transaction.
!d.-Employment--Written Authorization.- A letter from a
prospective buyer's
to a broker's employee
merely stating the tm.·ms and c·onditions on which such buyer
wns willing to
for the
hut not showing
the broker's empl oynJPnt to ad for
and indicating

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
Statute of, fl4 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Statute of
§ 14H et seq.
; Am.Jur., Brokers, § 24
See Cal.Jur.2d, Brohr~, ~ :Jii et
et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
11]
f.:')')
Broken;, ~ lH;
[7]
Brokers, § 22
25.
':'-;
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'·~nJJ~r·rihe(l

Cod<',

~

Ui:24;

Id.~Employment-~Written

Authorization.---The memorandum
the statute of frauds
to real estate brokers'
if there is

will

I d.--Employment--Written Authorization.-A writing "subthe
his
must unseeking
to recover a real estate enmmis~ion.
!91 !d.-Employment-Written Authorization.-When a law has
heen enaeted for the purpose of protection against assertion
of unfounded elaims, Rneh }lS those by brokers or ag£mts, it
should he so ronstrued a~ to pffect the object of the enactment.
110] !d.-Employment--Estoppel to Assert Statute.-A buyer of
realty sw~d
n broker for allegerl serviees in eonnection with
proeun•nH•nt of an option to purchase is not estopped to plead
the statute or frauds
reason of the faet that the buyer's
representativf' fln[lll,IT eonelud•:d an ornl option agreement with
the owner for purehasP of the property and the sale was subsequently
where the fact that the broker rendered serviees and conducted unsuccessful negotiations with
the owner dors not eonstitute n change of position to the
broker's detriment, and where the fact that the buyer refused
to pay the hrok<:r n commission on an option whieh the buyer
lntPl' procured throug-h direct negotiations with the owner does
not constitute an nnjnst (mriehnwnt within the meaning of the
estoppel doctrine.
[11] !d.-Employment--Written Authori.zation.~-A licensed real
estate broker
to know that contracts for real
estate eom:ni~sions are inYali<i ~md unenforceable unle'ls put in
writing and Rubscribed bv tllf~ prrson to he ehargNI. ( Civ.
Code, ~ J 624, suhd. 5; Code Civ. Proe., § 197:1, subil. fl.)

APPEAL from a jmlgmrni of tlle Snperior Court of I1os
Angeles Connty. Clanm(·e NI. Hanson, .Judge. Affirmed.
Action to reeover ~?ompeHsation for services rendered in
eonneetion with proeuring an option to purchase real propPrty. •Judgment for (lefenilant affirmed.
Gregory M. Crentz for Appellant.
Smith, Van Dyke & Hihlretb, H. Allen Smith and Jack E.
Hildreth for Rei'lpondent.
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In

its right to
tween the
which was
in
outset of the trial, the court deelared its
could not recover because the pleaded
was not
in writing as required by the statute of frauds. Plaintiff
thereupon made an offer of proof, and it was stipulated
that the documents pleaded in the amended complaint were
deemed to have been offered in evidenee, that an objection
was made thereto and sustained by the court. Judgment
was then entered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends: (1) that the
pleaded agreement does not come within the statute of
frauds; but (2) if the statute does apply, there was a
sufficient writing as required; and ( 3) in any event defendant is estopped to rely on the statute as a defense. Our
review of the record, in the light of the authorities hereinafter
cited, leads to the conclusion that plaintiff's contentions
cannot be sustained.
The substance of plaintiff's offer of proof is as follows:
Cliff A. Nelson, then an employee of the Fortune Realty
Company of San Jose, conducted certain negotiations with
defendant's representative, F. B. Stratton, for the purchase
of the property in question. Various propositions, offers, and
C:,Ounteroffers were discussed by the parties relating to the
purchase but no definite arrangements were concluded as to
the price to be paid, or concerning any employment of Nelson
individually, or of Fortune Realty Company to represent
defendant. \Vhile negotiations were still pending and on
August 15, 1950, Nelson became an employee of plaintiff and
remained in such employ until December 15, 1950. Meanwhile Nelson and Stratton continued to correspond. On
August 29, Stratton wrote to Nelson suggesting a price of
$3,000 per acre and $1,500 for an option. Nelson responded
by letter of August 31, advising Stratton that a meeting
should be arranged and proposing a 5 per cent commission
as defendant's broker.
On September 6, 1950, Stratton met Nelson and plaintiff's
president Creutz in Los Angeles. At that time Creutz examined a proposed option agreement submitted by Stratton,

Fortune Realty
''representing
... of
Lenfest
' and with the
of the above amount, or
. Nelson." This reference to '
relate(l to the

, will br
to commission'' obviStratton,
'Whereby
those
commission of
per cent of
purchase
between Nelson and
Fortune Healty
was written
after Nelson had left the
and long
the time that Stratton bad obtained the
from
this
claims that 5 per cent
or
for its alleged
c;erYices to defendant.
Plaintiff c:ontcnds that
or emreal property
not subject
or memorandum
thereof he in
subd. 5 ; Code Civ.
snbrL :),) Jn support of its
§1
plaintiff
relies on tlwse settled
: that an option to purchase
47 C.2d-3
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real
an irrevocable and
continuing offer to sell at a
within a specified
time; that it conveys no interest in land to the optionee but
yests in him
a right in personam to
at his election;
and that such agreement relating to the sale of land is "by no
means a sale of property, but is a sale of a right to purchase.''
(Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 CaL2d 766, 772
[192 P.2d 949, 3 A.L.R.2d 691]; Hicks v. Christeson, 174
CaL 712, 716 [164 P. 395] ; TransameTica Corp. v. Par·r1:ngton,
]15 CaLApp.2d 346, 851-353 [252 P.2d 385] ; see, also, Il.ritt
v. Athens Hills Dev. Co., 109 CaLApp.2d 642, 646 [241 P.2d
606]; Seeburg v. El Royale Corp., 54 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [128
P.2d 362] .) However, the cases upon which plaintiff relies
were not concerned with the application of the statute of
frauds but only with the distinction between the ''option
contract" and the "contract to which the irrevocable offer
of the optionor relates." ( W ar·ne1· Bros. Pictures v. Brodel,
supra.) It therefore does not follow, as plaintiff contends,
that since an option contract is not itself a contract for the
purchase or sale of real estate but only evidences the "right"
to performance of such agreed act, a contract employing a
broker to obtain the option does not fall within the statute
of frauds.
In California an option to purchase real property has
been held to come within the statute of frauds and so must
be in writing. (Bovo v. Abrahamson, 100 Cal.App. 373, 383
[280 P. 191] .) The propriety of this holding was recognized
in Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal.2d 416 [65 P.2d 770], where the
enforcement of an oral extension of a written option to repurchase certain real property was in question. After observing that ''certain contracts to be enforceable are required
to be in writing, or that some note or memorandum thereof
be in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged or his
agent" (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973), the
court stated that it is ''equally well settled that the facts of
a particular case may give rise to an equitable estoppel
against the party seeking to set up the statute of frauds and
foreclose such party from relying thereon." ( P. 421.) Upon
this basis of equitable estoppel, the court held that the fact
of oral extension of the option would not defeat the optionee's
rights thereunder.
Plaintiff cites Howard v. D. W. Hobson Co., 38 Cal.App.
445 [176 P. 715], for the proposition that a broker may recover on an oral contract of employment to procure an option

PAc. ETc. DEv. CoRP. v. WESTERN PAc. R. R. Co. 67
[47 C.2d 62; 301 P.2d 825]

of real
But that case concerned
between two brokers to divide equally a cornbe paid upon the sale of the land. This court,
denying the application for a hearing in that case, said
pages 460-461 : ''. . . we deem it proper to say that we
not prepared to hold that subdivision 6 of section 1624
the Civil Code [now subd. 5] is not applicable in the
of a simple contract between a real estate agent or
broker and a proposed purchaser to obtain an option for the
of real estate by the purchaser. 'l'he opinion clearly
that this was in substance a joint venture on the part
plaintiff and defendant for the sale of real property of
third party, and the distribution of the profits between
them. 'l'he District Court of Appeal was clearly right in conthat subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code
subd. 5] does not extend to agreements between brokers
cooperate in making sales for the sake of the commission
profits and that this substantially was such a case.''
[1] The term "real estate" as used in our statute of
frauds ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subcl. 5; Code Ci v. Proc., § 1973,
subd. 5) conforms with the common law definition of real
property as including only a freehold interest in land, and
excludes estates for years or lesser duration.
(Dabney v.
Rdwm·ds, 5 Cal.2d 1, 6-7 [53 P.2d 962, 103 A.L.R. 822] .)
Therefore, it has been held that while a contract employing
a broker to purchase or sell real estate comes within the statute
of frauds (Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal.2d
819 [205 P.2d 1025] ), a contract employing a broker
sell oil and gas leases running only for a fixed term of
years does not, because the latter employment relates to
''chattels real,'' a species of personal property as distinguished
l'rom "real estate" or "real property." (Dabney v. Edwards,
supra.)
[2] In determining the nature of the services which will
bring an employment contract within the statute, the phrase
"to sell or purcl1ase" includes "to aid or assist in the purchase or sale" of real estate. ( JIoopcr v. 1lfayfield, 114 Cal.
App.2d 802, 806 [251 P.2d 330]; Duckworth v. Schumacher,
135 Cal.App. G61, 666 f27 P.2d 919] .) Such broad construction of the term conforms with one of the primary purposes of the statute, the protection of real estate owners from
the assertion of false claims by brokers and agents. (Toomy
Dunphy, 86 Cal. 639, 642 [25 P. 130] ; also Gorham v.
Tfeiman, 90 Cal. 346, 358 [27 P. 289]; Hooper v. Mayfield,
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statute diseloses
to he shown in writing is
the broker to aet for the prineipal
CaLJur.2d §
p. 185; Toomy v.
642

kno\v

meet
up ..
'l'hP

mnount as a comswpra, 86 Cal.
56 Cal.

real estate
717;

819;
P.2ll

char·d v.
rnust therefore
wr1
hrre are insuf-ficient under the statnte
frauds to snsiain plaintiff's
claim. [9] As was said rrgarding this statute in Egan v.
Pacific Southwest Trttst & Sav. Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App. 1,
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at page 5: "When a law has been enacted irJr the purpose of
protection against the assertion of unfound<'d
it should
be so construed as to effect the
of the (mad.ment."
[10] Nor is there any merit to
contention that
defendant is estopped to plead the statute of frauds h.v reason
of the fact that Stratton, on behalf of
finally concluded an option agreement with Lenfest for pun·Jmse of
the property and the sale was subsequently ccnsummated. 'rhis
is not a case of unconscionable injury to plaintiff brcause
of a change of position in reliance upon the alleged contract
of employment (LeBlond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal.App.2d 282 [188
P.2d 278]) or an unjust enrichment of defendant through
acceptance of the benefits of the alleged contract without
itself being obligated thereunder. (1llonarco v. Lo Gr·eco, 35
Cal.2d 621 [220 P .2d 737].) The fact that plaintiff rendered
services and conducted unsuccessful negotiations with IJenfest
does not constitute a change of position to plaintiff's detriment, nor does the fact that defendant refused to pay plaintiff
a real estate commission upon an option which defendant
later procured through direct negotiations ·with I1enfest constitute an unjust enrichment within the meaning of the
estoppel doctrine. To hold otherwise, in the absence of any
showing of fraud, would defeat the purpose of the statute
of frauds in relation to real estate transactions. (Hicks v.
Post, 154 Cal. 22. 28 r96 P. 878] ; Augustine v. Trueco, 124
Cal.App.2d 229, 241-244 [268 P.2d 780]; Hoop('r· v. Mayfield,
supr·a, 114 Cal.App.2d 802, 809; Colbnrn v. 8essin, supra,
94 CaLApp.2d 4, 6.)
[11] Plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker and, as such,
is presumed to know that contracts for real estate commissions
are invalid and unenforceable unless put in writing and subscribed by the person to be charged. ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd.
5; Code Civ. Proc., § 1973, subd. 5; Steiner v. Rowley, supra,
35 Cal.2d 713,717; Marks v. Walter 0. JJ1cCady Cm·p., supra,
33 Cal.2d 814, 819.) Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to secure
proper written authorization to protect itself in the transaction. Rather it assumed the risk of relying upon claimed
oral promises of defendant, and it has no cause for complaint
if its efforts go unrewarded. (Augustine v. Tnwco, supra,
124 Cal.App.2d 229, 241.)
In conclusion, it should be said that this case clearly illustrates the desirability of requiring a written memorandum
of a contract employing any person as a broker in a transaction of the type involved. Prior to the time that Stratton
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directly from Lenfest at the price of
per acre, there was no memorandum signed by Stratton
which unequivocally evidenced the employment, as defendant's
of Nelson individually or Fortune Realty Company,
which was Nelson's former employer, or plaintiff, which was
subsequent employer. A reference to employment
and compensation was contained in the above-mentioned letter
Nelson to Stratton dated August 31, 1950, which sugthat a 5 per cent commission be paid by defendant,
but this was on the basis of securing an option from Lenfest,
seller, at the price of $2,500 per acre and subject to negotiations concerning certain further conditions. Prior to that
the correspondence between Nelson and Stratton is
entirely consistent with the idea that Nelson or his employer
should look to the owner of the property for any compensation
which might be anticipated. Not only did Stratton never
agree in writing to Nelson's suggestion of August 31, coneerning employment or commission but furthermore, no option
to purchase at $2,500 per acre was ever obtained. After
Lenfest refused to grant an option at that price and on satisfaetory conditions, Stratton and Lenfest negotiated directly,
and without the aid of any broker, upon the final terms of an
option at $2,750 per acre. In this situation, and without any
showing in the reeord that there was any binding obligation
on the part of defendant to pay a broker's commission to anyone, defendant finally agreed to, and did pay to, Fortune
Company and Nelson the sum of $5,112.94 for their
services. There is therefore no legal or equitable basis shown
to sustain plaintiff's action against defendant for its claimed
compensation in said transaction.
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent for the reasons set forth by Mr .
.Justice Fourt in the opinion prepared by him for the District
Court of Appeal in (Cal.App.) 293 P.2d 800.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! agree with Justice McComb
that the judgment should be reversed but I prefer to place
the reversal on another ground.
Regardless of whether an agreement employing a real
Pstate broker, for a commission, to seeure an option to pnrehase
rPal property does or does not come within the provisions
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the escrow
so
commission
told you we would pay
Fortune with the understandsubscribed
Stratton
of his office ·with
Commissioner,'' apprars on its face
nwmonmdum'' of employment
''Fortune,''
to the Jitigaacknowledged
and an obligation
a real estate
by the
plaintiff
demurrer.
of the agreemcn t meets t be
Standart
7), 174 CaL
.Tur.2d
In this connection

Tfalsh v.
; 23 CaL
that Nelson
tl1at "
my new conIndustrial Department
. . . Have

may appear to be due
up to the date of my
""'"-"'"''""' my salesman's license dovm
Co."
In the light of the circumstances shown
a question of mixed law and fact arises.
missible to construe defendant's aC!mission of
broker or agent, and admission of
for a
running· in favor of plaintiff~ It seems to me that we
should not hold on demurrer
the evidence as well as the
that a construction in favor of
could not
supported.
For the reasons above stated I would '~'C"""''"o
CA.RTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree with Mr. Justice McComb that an
to
obtain an option to buy real property does not come within an
employing an agent "to
or sell real
estate" within the statute of frauds inasmuch as it is nothing
than employing an agent to obtain
chose in action. ( Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 5.) In addition
the discussion in the able and learned
Mr. Justice Fourt for the District Court of
) 293 P.2d 800 adopted
Mr. Justice
should be mentioned that real property is defined as
tenements and hereditaments (Code Civ.
and personal property includes
chattels and '
111
action" (id., § 17, subd. . Hence
chose in
action is personal, not real,
and real
property are synonymous (City
25 Cal.App.2d 325 [77 P.2d 306]) and that is true with reference to the statute of frauds ( Civ.
§
subd. 5),
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here involved.
962, 103 A.L.R.
lease is not
supra, 5
reason why,
therefore,
should be read into the
statute.
I also agree with Mr. ,Justice Schauer in his
that,
assuming a writing is neeessary the case should be tried to see
if there is a sufficient memorandum here. The memorandum
pleaded appears to be sufficient.
I further believe,
that on the third ground urged
by plaintiff, estoppel, the defendant could not rely on the
statute of frauds. In 1vlonarco v. La
35 Cal.2d 621
[220 P.2d 737], this court clarified the law in relation to
estoppel to plead the statute of frauds. This court stated two
fundamental principles: (1) Estoppel to rely on the statute
of frauds may exist where injury would result when the party
has changed his position in reliance on the oral contract, or
(2) unjust enrichment would result to the other person if
he were permitted to assert the statute successfully. The
question then is only, was the injury which resulted from
plaintiff's change of position, and the resulting unjust enrichment of defendant, sufficient. In the Monarco case the supplying of services to the parents for many years in reliance on
the oral contract was held enough under both principles. In
the instant case plaintiff had rendered valuable services to defendant to obtain an option on the ]and in reliance on the oral
contract and hence was injured. Defendant was unjustly enriched by the acceptance of those services (he obtained the
option) for which he refused to pay. Suppose plaintiff had
devoted all of his time to the project for five years, would
there be any doubt that there was both injury and unjust
enrichment? In Ruincllo v. Murray, 36 CaL2d 687 [227 P.2d
251], this court held there was no injury because the employee
was paid for his services bnt clearly intimated he could recover the reasonable value thereof to the extent it was above
what he was actually paid. There can be no doubt, therefore,
that plaintiff here should be entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services even though the contract vYas oral. Some
of the cases cited in the majority opinion for the proposition
that there cannot be estoppel as to real estate brokers' contracts were before the decision in the .M:onarco case (see
Hicks v. Post, 154 Cal. 22 [96 P. 878]; Colburn v. Sessin,

October
were of the

Oct. 5,

Petitioner, v* ALICE DAVIS, as
et
; EDWARD J.
in Interest.
Counties~Charters.--County charter
adopted pursuant to constitutional authorization are not limited by the
law which
otherwise apply.

[2a, 2b] Elections-Nominations-Names Which Go on Ballot at
Final Election.-Under
charter provisions declaring
that "~Whenever a vacaney shall occur in an elective office in
this County other than a member of the Board of Supervisors
the Board
shall fill such vacancy . . . until the election
and
of his successor" and that "In case of any
such
there shall be elected at the next general electo fill sueh vaeaney for the unexpired term, unterm ends on the first Monday after the
next succeeding the election, in which
case the election
he for the unexpired term and for an
entire new term in addition," the unexpired term of a district
attorney who was elected in November, 1954, for a term which
is to
in
1959, and who resigned from such
offier on June lJ,
to be filled by election at the first
general election which oceurs following the vacancy, for which
election candidates could qualify under any method prescribed
by
and the fact that the vacancy did not occur until
after the
election of ,June 5, 1956, is immaterial.
[3] !d.-Construction of Statutes.--The language of an election
law cmmot be altered
of its effect,
uor ean the
of
by failure
See Cal.Jur.2d,
§ 26 et seq.
See Cal.Jur.2d,
McK. Dig. References: [1] Counties, § 4; [2, 4] Elections, § 41;
Elections, § 8;
Elections, § 8.

